CACI No. 440. Negligent Use of Nondeadly Force by Law Enforcement Officer in Arrest or Other Seizure - Essential Factual Elements

Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions (2024 edition)

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440 . Negligent Use of Nondeadly Force by Law Enforcement

Of ficer in Arrest or Other Seizure - Essential Factual Elements

A law enfor cement of f icer may use r easonable force to [arr est/detain/

[,/or] prevent escape of/ [,/or] over come resistance by] a person when the

of f icer has r easonable cause to believe that that person has committed or

is committing a crime. However , the off icer may use only that degree of

force necessary to [arr est/detain/ [,/or] prevent escape of/ [,/or] over come

resistance by] the person. [Even if the o ff icer is mistaken, a person being

arrested or detained has a duty not to use force to r esist the of f icer

unless the of f icer is using unr easonable force.].

[ Name of plaintiff ] claims that [ name of defendant ] was negligent in using

unreasonable for ce to [arrest/detain/ [,/or] pr event escape of/ overcome

resistance by] [him/her/ nonbinary pr onoun ]. T o establish this claim, [ name

of plaintiff ] must prove all of the following:

1. That [ name of defendant ] used force to [arrest/detain/ [,/or]

prevent escape of/ [,/or] overcome resistance by] [ name of

2. That the amount of force used by [ name of defendant ] was

unreasonable;

3. That [ name of plaintiff ] was harmed; and

4. That [ name of defendant ]’s use of unreasonable force was a

substantial factor in causing [ name of plaintiff ]’s harm.

In deciding whether [ name of defendant ] used unreasonable for ce, you

must consider the totality of the cir cumstances to determine what

amount of force a r easonable [ insert type of offıcer ] in [ name of

defendant ]’ s position would have used under the same or similar

circumstances. “T otality of the circumstances” means all facts known to

the of f icer at the time, including the conduct of [ name of defendant ] and

[ name of plaintiff ] leading up to the use of force. Among the factors to be

considered ar e the following:

(a) Whether [ name of plaintiff ] reasonably appeared to pose an

immediate threat to the safety of [ name of defendant ] or others;

(b) The seriousness of the crime at issue; [and]

(c) Whether [ name of plaintiff ] was actively resisting [arrest/detention]

or attempting to avoid [arrest/detention] by flight[; and/.]

[(d) [ Name of defendant ]’s tactical conduct and decisions before using

force on [ name of plaintiff ].]

[An of f icer who makes or attempts to make an arrest does not have to

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retr eat or stop because the person being arr ested is resisting or

threatening to r esist. T actical repositioning or other deescalation tactics

are not r etreat. An of ficer does not lose the right to self-defense by using

objectively reasonable for ce to [arrest/detain/ [,/or] pr event escape of/

[,/or] overcome r esistance by] the person.]

New June 2016; Revised May 2020, November 2020, May 2021

Directions for Use

Use this instruction if the plaintif f makes a negligence claim under state law arising

from the force used in ef fecting an arrest or detention. Such a claim is often

combined with a claimed civil rights violation under 42 United States Code section

1983. See CACI No. 3020, Excessive Use of Force - Unr easonable Arr est or Other

Seizur e - Essential Factual Elements. It might also be combined with a claim for

battery . See CACI No. 1305, Battery by Peace Offıcer - Essential Factual Elements .

For additional authorities on excessive force by a law enforcement of ficer , see the

Sources and Authority to these two CACI instructions.

By its terms, Penal Code section 835a’ s deadly force provisions apply to “peace

of ficers.” It would appear that a negligence claim involving nondeadly force does

not depend on whether the individual qualifies as a peace of ficer under the Penal

Code. (See Pen. Code, § 835a; see also Pen. Code, § 830 et seq. [defining “peace

of ficer”].) For cases involving the use of deadly force by a peace o ff icer, use CACI

No. 441, Negligent Use of Deadly For ce by Peace Offıcer - Essential Factual

Elements . (Pen. Code, § 835a.) This instruction and CACI No. 441 may require

modification if the jury must decide whether the force used by the defendant was

deadly or nondeadly .

Include the last bracketed sentence in the first paragraph only if there is evidence

the person being arrested or detained used force to resist the of ficer .

Factors (a), (b), and (c) are often referred to as the “ Graham factors.” (See Graham

v . Connor (1989) 490 U.S. 386, 396 [109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443].) The

Graham factors are to be applied under California negligence law . ( Hernandez v .

City of Pomona (2009) 46 Cal.4th 501, 514 [94 Cal.Rptr .3d 1, 207 P .3d 506].) They

are not exclusive (see Glenn v . W ash. County (9th Cir . 2011) 673 F .3d 864, 872);

additional factors may be added if appropriate to the facts of the case. If negligence,

civil rights, and battery claims are all involved, the instructions can be combined so

as to give the Graham factors only once. A sentence may be added to advise the

jury that the factors apply to multiple claims.

Factor (d) is bracketed because no reported California state court decision has held

that an of ficer ’ s tactical decisions before using nondeadly force can be actionable

negligence. It has been held that liability can arise if the of ficer ’ s earlier tactical

conduct and decisions show , as part of the totality of circumstances, that the

ultimate use of deadly force was unreasonable. ( Hayes v . County of San Diego

(2013) 57 Cal.4th 622, 639 [160 Cal.Rptr .3d 684, 305 P .3d 252].) In this respect,

NEGLIGENCE CACI No. 440

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California negligence law dif fers from the federal standard under the Fourth

Amendment. ( Hayes, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 639 [“[T]he state and federal standards

are not the same, which we now confirm”]; cf. V os v . City of Newport Beach (9th

Cir . 2018) 892 F .3d 1024, 1037 [“T o determine police liability [under state law

negligence], a court applies tort law’ s ‘reasonable care’ standard, which is distinct

from the Fourth Amendment’ s ‘reasonableness’ standard. The Fourth Amendment is

narrower and ‘plac[es] less emphasis on preshooting conduct.’”)

Include the final bracketed paragraph only if the defendant claims that the person

being arrested resisted arrest or threatened resistance.

Sources and Authority

• Legislative Findings re Use of Force by Law Enforcement. Penal Code section

• Use of Objectively Reasonable Force to Arrest. Penal Code section 835a(b).

• When Peace Of ficer Need Not Retreat. Penal Code section 835a(d).

• Definitions. Penal Code section 835a(e).

• “There is an abundance of authority permitting a plaintif f to go to the jury on

both intentional and negligent tort theories, even though they are inconsistent. It

has often been pointed out that there is no prohibition against pleading

inconsistent causes of action stated in as many ways as plaintif f believes his

evidence will show , and he is entitled to recover if one well pleaded count is

supported by the evidence.” ( Grudt v . City of Los Angeles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 575,

586 [86 Cal.Rptr . 465, 468 P .2d 825].)

• “The evidence relevant to negligence and intentional tort overlaps here and

presents a case similar to Grudt . . . . [¶] This court held it was reversible error

to exclude the negligence issue from the jury even though plaintif f also had pled

intentional tort. The court pointed to the rule that a party may proceed on

inconsistent causes of action unless a nonsuit is appropriate.” ( Munoz v . Olin

(1979) 24 Cal.3d 629, 635 [156 Cal.Rptr . 727, 596 P .2d 1 143].)

• “Consistent with these principles and the factors the high court has identified, the

federal court in this case did not instruct the jury to conduct some abstract or

nebulous balancing of competing interests. Instead, as noted above, it instructed

the jury to determine the reasonableness of the of ficers’ actions in light of ‘the

totality of the circumstances at the time,’ including ‘the severity of the crime at

issue, whether the plaintif f posed a reasonable threat to the safety of the of f icer

or others, and whether the plaintif f was actively resisting detention or attempting

to escape.’ The same consideration of the totality of the circumstances is

required in determining reasonableness under California negligence law .

Moreover , California’ s civil jury instructions specifically direct the jury , in

determining whether police of ficers used unreasonable force for purposes of tort

liability , to consider the same factors that the high court has identified and that

the federal court’ s instructions in this case set forth. (Judicial Council of Cal.

Civ . Jury Instns. (2008) CACI No. 1305.) Thus, plainti ffs err in ar guing that the

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federal and state standards of reasonableness dif fer in that the former involves a

fact finder ’ s balancing of competing interests.” ( Hernandez, supra , 46 Cal.4th at

p. 514, internal citation omitted.)

• “Determining whether the force used to ef fect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’

under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of ‘ “the nature and

quality of the intrusion on the individual’ s Fourth Amendment interests” ’ against

the countervailing governmental interests at stake. Our Fourth Amendment

jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or

investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of

physical coercion or threat thereof to ef fect it. Because ‘[t]he test of

reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition

or mechanical application,’ however , its proper application requires careful

attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the

severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to

the safety of the of ficers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or

attempting to evade arrest by flight.” ( Graham, supra , 490 U.S. at p. 396,

internal citations omitted.)

• “The most important of these [ Graham factors, above] is whether the suspect

posed an immediate threat to the of ficers or others, as measured objectively

under the circumstances.” ( Mendoza v . City of W est Covina (2012) 206

Cal.App.4th 702, 712 [141 Cal.Rptr .3d 553].)

• “Plaintif f must prove unreasonable force as an element of the tort.” ( Edson v .

City of Anaheim (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1272 [74 Cal.Rptr .2d 614].)

• “ ‘ “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the

perspective of a reasonable of ficer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision

of hindsight. . . . [T]he question is whether the of ficers’ actions are ‘objectively

reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without

regard to their underlying intent or motivation. . . .” ’ In calculating whether the

amount of force was excessive, a trier of fact must recognize that peace of ficers

are often forced to make split-second judgments, in tense circumstances,

concerning the amount of force required.” ( Br own v . Ransweiler (2009) 171

Cal.App.4th 516, 527-528 [89 Cal.Rptr .3d 801], internal citations omitted.)

• “ ‘[A]s long as an of ficer ’ s conduct falls within the range of conduct that is

reasonable under the circumstances, there is no requirement that he or she

choose the “most reasonable” action or the conduct that is the least likely to

cause harm and at the same time the most likely to result in the successful

apprehension of a violent suspect, in order to avoid liability for negligence.’”

( Hayes , supra , 57 Cal.4th at p. 632.)

• “The California Supreme Court did not address whether decisions before non-

deadly force can be actionable negligence, but addressed this issue only in the

context of ‘deadly force.’” ( Mulligan v . Nichols (9th Cir . 2016) 835 F .3d 983,

• “[T]here is no right to use force, reasonable or otherwise, to resist an unlawful

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detention . . . .” ( Evans v . City of Bakersfield (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 321, 333

[27 Cal.Rptr .2d 406].)

• “[E]xecution of an unlawful arrest or detention does not give license to an

individual to strike or assault the of ficer unless excessive force is used or

threatened; excessive force in that event triggers the individual’ s right of self-

defense.” ( Evans, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 331, original italics, internal

citation omitted.)

Secondary Sources

5 W itkin, Summary of California Law (1 1th ed. 2017) T orts, § 496

3 Levy et al., California T orts, Ch. 41, Assault and Battery , § 41.24 seq. (Matthew

6 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 58, Assault and Battery , § 58.22

(Matthew Bender)

CACI No. 440 NEGLIGENCE

Page last reviewed May 2024

Kathryn Robb

Kathryn Robb, National Director of the Children’s Justice Campaign at Enough Abuse, discusses Vice President Kamala Harris’s unusual mention of child sexual abuse during her Democratic National Convention speech and its broader implications for addressing this issue in America.

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